An experiment was conducted to replicate and extend previous findings that traits are considered to be more important than group memberships (Trafimow & Finlay, 2001) . In the present experiment, relationships were evaluated as well as traits and group membership. Participants listed five of their traits, five of their group memberships, and five of their relationships. They then ranked (relative to each other) and rated (in absolute terms) the importance of these traits, groups, and relationships. Consistent with Trafimow and Finlay (2001) , traits were considered more important than group memberships. A new finding was that relationships were also considered more important than group memberships. Further, the data also indicated that, whereas the perceived importance of traits and groups is only weakly related to their cognitive accessibility, the perceived importance of relationships is significantly more related to their accessibility. Taken together, the findings suggest that even in individualist cultures, people think their relationships with others are more important than the literature on individualism might suggest. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
On the other hand, perhaps even individualists care a great deal about their relationships with other people, but measures of individualism do not capture this. Although there are few data to support this perspective, there are also few data to disconfirm it. Thus, it remains possible that relational self-cognitions are considered quite important in individualist cultures, possibly as important as private self-cognitions. We freely admit that the trend in the literature provides more support for the former perspective than for the latter one (see Triandis & Trafimow, 2001a , 2001b ), but we also believe that none of the data in existence provide a clear test between the two perspectives.
The present experiment tests these alternatives against each other. Participants wrote five private, five collective, and five relational self-cognitions (for a total of 15 self-cognitions). They later rated (on an absolute scale) and ranked (relative to each other) the importance of the various self-cognitions they had previously listed. We were interested in three issues. The main issue of concern was the relative importance of the three types of self-cognitions. We were also concerned with the actual number of self-cognitions that participants considered to be important and whether this number was different for the three different self-structures. Some researchers have performed studies involvinglarge numbers of group memberships (e.g., Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995 asked participants to list 64 group memberships) and we were curious to determine how many of the different types of self-cognitions (private, collective, and relational) are actually considered to be important. Third, we wished to investigate whether the relative importance of private, collective, and relational self-cognitions depended on participants' ethnicity (Anglo-American or Mexican-American).
1. Method
Participants
Forty-seven undergraduates at an American university volunteered to participate in the experiment. Forty-five percent (21) identified themselves as Anglo-Americans and 55% (26) identified themselves as Mexican-Americans. We assumed that the Anglo-American subculture is individualist and the Mexican-American subculture is relatively collectivist (Freeberg & Stein, 1996; Hosch, Chanez, Bothwell, & Munoz, 1991; Schutte, Velerio, & Carillo, 1996) .
Procedure
Participants wrote five private self-cognitions (these were defined for participants as "personal qualities, attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors"), five collective self-cognitions (these were defined for participants as "groups you belong to"), and five relational self-cognitions (these were defined for participants as "relationships that you have with other people"). Examples of private self-cognitions were, "I am impatient," "I am smart," and others. Examples of collective self-cognitions were, "I am a woman," "I am a Catholic," and others. Examples of relational self-cognitions were, "I am a daughter," "I am a sister," and others. Subsequently, participants indicated bow important each item was to their self-identity (defined for participants as "who you think you are") using two different methods. First, participants rated the importance of each item on a scale from 1 to 99, with higher numbers corresponding to greater importance. Second, they rank ordered the items in terms of their relative importance. Thus, ranks were integers between I and 15, with 1 being the most highly ranked item and 15 being the least ranked item (so higher numbers have opposite meanings for ratings and rankings). Note that in the ranking task, no two items could have been ranked by the same number, but in the rating task, they could have been rated the same.
Results
All ratings and rankings were analyzed using 2 (Anglo-American or Mexican-American) x 3 (private, collective, or relational self-cognitions listed) x 5 (most important, second most important, third most important, fourth most important, and least important item listed within each type of self-cognition) mixed ANOVAs with the first factor as the between-participants factor. Tables 1 and 2 present the resulting means. In contrast to Trafimow and Finlay (2001) , participants' ethnicity was not involved in any main effects or interactions. Possible reasons for this lack of an effect will be discussed later. Consequently, cells were collapsed across this factor in all of the analyses reported below. Table 3 contains the mean ratings and rankings that were used in the subsequent analyses.
Ratings
Ratings were analyzed using a 3 (type of self-cognitions listed) x 5 (item importance) within-subjects ANOVA. Not surprisingly, there was an item importance main effect which indicated that more important items were rated as significantly more important than less important items, F(4, 180) = 107.03, p < .05. There was also a main effect for type of self-cognitions listed that was of more theoretical interest, F(2, 90) = 7.71, p < .05. Collective self-cognitions (M = 69.84) were rated as being less important than either private (M = 77.17) or relational self-cognitions (M = 79.57), p < .05 for both contrasts. There was no discernible difference in the rated importance of private versus relational self-cognitions. Finally, the main effects were qualified by an item importance x type of self-cognitions listed interaction, F(8, 360) = 2.30, p < .05. Additional analyses indicated that as participants went from the most to the least important cognitions, there was a much steeper drop in rated importance of collective self-cognitions than private self-cognitions. For example, the difference between most important and least important collective, private, and relational self-cognitions was 46.30 versus 36.1 1, and 35.05, respectively, p < .05 for both analyses. There was no discernible difference in the rate of decrease between private and relational self-cognitions. 
Rankings
Rankings were analyzed using a 3 (type of self-cognitions listed) x 5 (item importance) within-subjects ANOVA that was analogous to the ANOVA performed for ratings (remember, however, that lower numbers mean higher rankings). Again, there was a main effect for the item importance factor [F(4, 184) = 366.32, p < .05], which indicates that more important items were ranked as significantly more important than less important items (see bottom half of Table 3 ). There was also a more interesting main effect for the type of self-cognitions listed factor [F(2, 92) = 8.85, p < .05], which indicates that collective self-cognitions were ranked lower in importance than private self-cognitions or relational self-cognitions (M = 9.06 vs. M = 7.79 and M = 6.76, p < .05 for both contrasts). Finally, both main effects were qualified by an item importance x type of self-cognitions listed interaction, F(8, 368) = 3.45, p < .05. Again, the decrease in ranked importance from the most important item to the least important item was greater for collective self-cognitions than for private self-cognitions. Specifically, the difference between the most and least important collective self-cognition was 9.32, whereas the difference between most important and least important private self-cognition was 7.06. The decrease was also greater for collective self-cognitions than for relational self-cognitions (difference between most important and least important relational self-cognition was 8.77), but not significantly so (p = .12). Comparing the magnitude of the rankings of the most and least important relational and private self-cognitions in Table 3 shows the reason this effect did not achieve significance. Although the least important relational self-cognition was ranked to be of approximately equal importance as the least important private self-cognition (11.62 vs. 11.17, respectively), the most important relational self-cognition was ranked as much more important than the most important private self-cognition (2.85 vs. 4.11, respectively). Because the first few relational self-cognitions were ranked as so important, the difference between the most and least important relational self-cognitions was just large enough that it was not significantly different from the analogous difference for collective self-cognitions. According to this interpretation, the difference between the rankings of the most and least important relational self-cognitions should be greater than that for private self-cognitions, and it was, F(4, 184) = 4.05, p < .05.
The correlation betveen importance and accessibility
Although our main focus was on the relativeimportance of the three types of self-cognitions, these data also provided an opportunity to assess the relation between the importance and accessibility of the different types of self-cognitions. Because each participant wrote down five private, collective, and relational self-cognitions, the order in which self-cognitions were written (within type of self-cognition) provided a rough measure of their accessibility. We assumed that the first item of a particular type of self-cognition was the most accessible, the second item was next in accessibility, and so on. Given this assumption, we computed within-participants correlations between rated importance and accessibility for each type of self-cognition and between the ranked importance and accessibility for each type of self-cognition. The correlations between rated importance and accessibility were .09, .26, and .40 for private, collective, and relational self-cognitions, respectively. Only the latter two correlations were significantly different from zero. We also compared the three correlations directly. The correlation for relational self-cognitions was significantly greater than the correlation for private self-cognitions [t(45) = 3.88, p < .05], and it was not significantly greater than the correlation for collective self-cognitions [t(46) = 1.73, p = .09].
We performed similar analyses on the correlations between ranked importance and accessibility. However, because low numbers for rankings indicated greater importance, we multiplied these scores by -1 in order to have positive correlations. Consequently, the three transformed correlations were .23, .17, and .43 for private, collective, and relational self-cognitions, respectively. All three correlations were significandy different from zero. The correlation for relational self-cognitions was significantly greater than either of the other correlations (p < .05 in both cases).
In short, as Trafimow and Finlay (2001) found, the correlations between importance and accessibility were low for private and collective self-cognitions, though generally different from zero. However, there appeared to be a stronger relation between importance and accessibility for relational self-cognitions.
Content analyses
Similar to Trafimow and Finlay (2001) , we content analyzed the collective and relational self-cognitions to investigate whether there were differences in the cognitions listed by AngloAmericans and Mexican-Americans. Two coders, who were unaware of participant ethnicity performed the content analyses. Kappa coefficients of 0.88 and 0.94 for the collective and relational self-cognitions, respectively, indicated that the coding had satisfactory reliability.
Collective self-cognitions
The collective self-cognitions fell into 11 general categories. These were ethnicity (18%o), gender (16%), religion (14%), being a student (13%), political affiliation (7%), family (4%), major (2%), clubs (or activities or volunteer groups) (9%), career (9%), miscellaneous (4%), or responses that were not actual collective self-cognitions (not about groups to which the participant belonged) (2%). To test whether there were differences in the collective self-cognitions mentioned by Anglo-Americans versus Mexican-Americans, an overall chi-square analysis (2 ethnic categories by 11 types of collective self-cognitions) was performed, X2(lO) = 19.27, p < .05. We then performed 11 additional chi-square analyses to identify exactly which type of self-cognition was responsible for the effect. The only one of these analyses that was significant pertained to the clubs/activities/volunteer groups category, X 2 (l) = 7.39, p < .01. Anglo-Americans were more likely than Mexican-Americans to list this category (15% vs. 4%).
Relational self-cognitions
Participants' relational self-cognitions were also assigned to 11 categories: parent/child (25%), siblings (13%), grandparent/grandchild (8%), friend/roommate (20%), significant other/ lover/spouse/date (13%), work relationships (5%), school relationships (2%), mentor (1%), acquaintance/colleague/associate (1%), miscellaneous (9%), or responses that were not actual relational self-cognitions (not about a relationship (2%o)). We performed an overall chi-square analysis (2 ethnic categories by 11 types of relational selfecognitions) to determine whether Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans differed in the types of relational self-cognitions they listed. In fact, not only was this analysis non-significant, but a subsequent set of 11 analyses on specific categories of relational self-cognitions also resulted in non-significant findings.
Discussion
These data replicated several findings reported by Trafimow and Finlay (2001) . Private self-cognitions were rated and ranked as more important than collective self-cognitions. People also perceived more traits and relationships to be important than group memberships. As Table 3 demonstrates, only the first two or three collective self-cognitions were considered important, whereas most of the private and relational self-cognitions (four/five) were considered important. There was also a greater decrease in the rated and ranked importance of collective self-cognitions than private self-cognitions as participants went from the most to the least important cognitions indicating that even the least important traits are considered more important than the least important group memberships.
These data did not replicate Trafimow and Finlay's (2001) findings in that we did not find a significant difference between the rankings and ratings provided by Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans. One possible reason for our failure to replicate this difference is that we had fewer participants, and hence less power, than Trafirnow and Finlay (2001) . A second possibility is that because participants also rated and ranked relational self-cognitions, the task was more complicated than in the previous study, which made for greater error variance. This greater error variance may have masked higher order interactions involving ethnicity.
It is worth noting that the content analyses did reveal a difference between Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans in the collective self-cognitions that were mentioned. Anglo-Americans mentioned more clubs/activities/volunteer groups than did Mexican-Americans. Interestingly, these types of groups tend to be voluntary, and anyone canjoin them or leave them easily. According to the cross-cultural literature (see Triandis, 1994; Triandis & Trafimow, 2001a) , people in individualist cultures are very concerned with getting to do what they want to do whereas people in collectivist cultures are more concerned with doing what authority figures think they should do. So it makes sense that people from an individualist culture would be more likely than people from a collectivist one to mention a type of group where membership is voluntary.
More importantly, however, because we included relational self-cognitions in the present study, it was possible to perform new tests of the importance of relational self-cognitions compared to private and collective self-cognitions. According to the traditional view, people in individualist cultures (especially Anglo-Americans) are "self-centered," in that they view their traits as moreimportant to their self-identity than theirrelationships with otherpeople. From this perspective, relational self-cognitions should be rated and ranked as less important than private self-cognitions. In fact, the data contradicted this view. Relational self-cognitions were rated as being significantly more important than collective self-cognitions, and as non-significantly more important than private self-cognitions. The rankings further confirmed the importance of relational self-cognitions. Relational self-cognitions were ranked as more important than collective self-cognitions, and as non-significantly more important than private self-cognitions.
The ranking data pointed to one other interesting finding. The most important relational self-cognitions were clearly considered more important than the most important private or collective self-cognitions (see Table 3 ), with the private self-cognitions tending to catch up around the least important self-cognition (the fifth ones). This last analysis suggests that the most important relational self-cognitions are of paramount importance, and that they should receive much more attention in the literature. This pattern of findings is interesting because it contradicts a possible demand characteristic. That is, perhaps participants ranked relational self-cognitions as being particularly important because they did not want to appear insensitive. But if this were true, then why did the private self-cognitions catch up with the relational ones in ranked importance for the less important self-cognitions? Either there was no problem regarding demand characteristics, or the demand characteristic was quite a complicated one that applied to more important self-cognitions but did not apply to less important ones.
The analyses pertaining to the relation between accessibility and importance were also interesting. Consistent with Trafimow and Finlay (2001) , the correlation between accessibility and importance was low for private and collective self-cognitions. However, there was a new finding of a substantial correlation for relational self-cognitions. Why should accessibility and importance be more strongly related for relational than private or collective self-cognitions? If we assume that the accessibility of self-cognitions is a function of how much we have thought about them, then the high correlation for relational self-cognitions indicates that we think a lot about the people who are important to us, whereas we do not necessarily think a lot about the traits or group memberships that are important to us. It may be that important relationships present more problems than do important traits or group memberships (especially if your groups are easy to leave). These problems have to be dealt with, and doing so increases their cognitive accessibility. A second possibility is that important relationships are more fun to think about than are important traits or group memberships, so we think about them more, and doing so increases their cognitive accessibility. A third possibility is that we have strong affective reactions to incidents involving people with whom we have important relationships. These strong affective reactions stimulate us to think about these relationships, which increases their cognitive accessibility. Obviously, more research will be needed to discriminate between these possibilities.
An assumption we made throughout the analyses of correlations between perceived importance and accessibility is that the first item people wrote was the most accessible, the second item was second in accessibility, and so on. This might not be strictly true. Although we think it is likely, in general, that more accessible cognitions were written earlier, it is possible that in particular cases there were other reasons for writing self-cognitions. For example, if someone just had an argument with a parent, then the person's relationship with that parent might be temporarily more accessible than usual. Or, it is possible that, for a few participants, two or more self-cognitions came to mind approximately simultaneously. In this case, the order of the self-cognitions that were actually written might have been the result of some sort of sorting process. All of these kinds of issues possibly added error variance to the accessibility measurement, and this added error variance may have reduced the size of the correlations between accessibility and perceived importance.
Conclusion
Many researchers have performed studies that assume that a large number of collective self-cognitions are important (e.g., Deaux et al., 1995) . The present findings contradict this assumption. Along with Trafimow and Finlay (2001) , we suggest that only two or three group memberships are considered to be particularly important, even for Mexican-Americans. More importantly, we found that relational self-cognitions are considered at least as important as private self-cognitions, which contradicts traditional thinking about people in individualist cultures. In addition, the fact that the corTelation between importance and cognitive accessibility is largest for relational self-cognitions highlights the possibility that these types of self-cognitions are processed differently than are private or collective self-cognitions. We believe that the combination of findings pertaining to the importance of relational self-cognitions, and the impressive importance-accessibility correlation for relational self-cognitions, suggests that there is a great deal of potential for future research in this area. 
